The aim of this course is to equip students with the tools required to understand game theory and its traditional solution concepts.
Game theory is the mathematical analysis of strategic interactions.
The course will cover normal form and extensive form games, games of perfect, imperfect and incomplete information, and will present equilibrium concepts such as Nash equilibrium, perfect equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, and sequential equilibrium.
We will also discuss a variety of examples including classic games and some economic applications.
Expected learning outcomes
By the end of the course students will be able to model situations of economic and social interaction as games, discuss and predict the behavior of players according to different solution concepts, understand the benefits and limitations of those concepts, model incomplete information in games, and critically comprehend existing economic models.
Lesson period: First trimester
(In case of multiple editions, please check the period, as it may vary)
There is no formal requirement. Students must be comfortable with mathematical thinking and rigorous arguments.
A. Mas-Colell, M.D. Whinston, J.R. Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press. E. van Damme, Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
Assessment methods and Criteria
The final assessment is based on a written exam at the end of the course, which will focus on material presented and discussed in lectures. Students can gain extra points through active participation during lectures.