Facts, Principles and Hard Choices
A.Y. 2021/2022
Learning objectives
The course aims at introducing the student to the field of moral philosophy, as presently practiced at an international level. Familiarity with the general framework of ethical discussions will enable students to appropriately contextualise a large variety of contemporary issues within different areas of ethical and political concern.
Expected learning outcomes
At the end of the course, students will be acquainted with the main normative theories in ethics, and with some basic philosophical questions raised by the practice of moral judgment. They will be able to frame the normative discussion concerning practical issues within the context of ethical theories, to reflectively endorse and defend specific moral views and to present normative options in suitable terms. They will possess the basic tools to engage in personal research in the field.
Lesson period: Second trimester
Assessment methods: Esame
Assessment result: voto verbalizzato in trentesimi
Single course
This course cannot be attended as a single course. Please check our list of single courses to find the ones available for enrolment.
Course syllabus and organization
Single session
Lesson period
Second trimester
The lessons will be held in presence. Students can attend online through Microsoft Teams at the following link for the team of Facts, principles, and hard choices: https://teams.microsoft.com/l/team/19%3a2578989657a54c148d773d4bc27cd0e0%40thread.tacv2/conversations?groupId=e75095e0-1dd1-4bec-9ad4-c36ca0124d4e&tenantId=13b55eef-7018-4674-a3d7-cc0db06d545c
Course syllabus
The course will have three sections: the first will be devoted to characterizing morality as a distinctive form of normative enterprise; in particular, we will try to distinguish morality, and its rules and principles, from law, aesthetics and convention or etiquette. The relationship of morality with religion and metaphysical ideas of free will will also be touched upon. The second section will present and discuss the main current alternatives as far as normative theories of right action is concerned: the various forms of consequentialism (act- or rule-based), with its different attached theories of the good life (hedonism, desire-theory, perfectionism); the different forms of deontological theories, both duty-based and rights-based; the main versions of either Aristotelian or agent-based virtue ethics. The third section will shortly present the basic alternatives as far as metaethical views on morality are concerned: expressivism and error theory on the one side, and naturalistic and non-naturalistic forms of moral objectivism on the other.
[Program]:
Section 1: The definition of morality
The idea of morality: moral norms vs. legal norms, aesthetic rules, and the norms of convention or etiquette
Moral judgment and the moral point of view
The relationship between religion and morality
Moral responsibility and free will
Section 2: Normative theories
Forms of consequentialism: ethical egoism and utilitarianism
Act-consequentialism and rule-consequentialism
Theories of the good life: hedonism, preferentialism or desire-theory, perfectionism or the 'objective list' theory
Deontological views in ethics: duty-based and rights-based theories
Theories of unconditional duties and theories of prima facie duties
Rights as side-constraints and the rationality of agent-relative restrictions
The critique of 'modern morality' and Aristotelian views on virtue ethics
Agent-based vs. agent-focus virtue ethics
Section 3: The Status of Morality
The critique of value objectivism: non cognitivism and error theory
The defense of value objectivism: naturalistic and non-naturalistic forms of moral realism.
[Program]:
Section 1: The definition of morality
The idea of morality: moral norms vs. legal norms, aesthetic rules, and the norms of convention or etiquette
Moral judgment and the moral point of view
The relationship between religion and morality
Moral responsibility and free will
Section 2: Normative theories
Forms of consequentialism: ethical egoism and utilitarianism
Act-consequentialism and rule-consequentialism
Theories of the good life: hedonism, preferentialism or desire-theory, perfectionism or the 'objective list' theory
Deontological views in ethics: duty-based and rights-based theories
Theories of unconditional duties and theories of prima facie duties
Rights as side-constraints and the rationality of agent-relative restrictions
The critique of 'modern morality' and Aristotelian views on virtue ethics
Agent-based vs. agent-focus virtue ethics
Section 3: The Status of Morality
The critique of value objectivism: non cognitivism and error theory
The defense of value objectivism: naturalistic and non-naturalistic forms of moral realism.
Prerequisites for admission
There are no prerequisites for this course.
Teaching methods
Frontal lectures and discussion in class
Teaching Resources
- Frankena, Ethics, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs NJ 1973, chap. 1
- Strawson, Freedom and resentment, Proceedings of the British Academy, 48, 1962, pp. 187-211
- Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1997, pp. 155-184
- Hare, Moral Thinking, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1981, chap. 3, pp. 44-64 (you will find the whole book in the syllabus, but only chap. 3 is required reading)
- Taylor, Determinism and the Theory of Agency, pp. 308-311
Section 2: Normative theories
- Smart, Extreme and restricted utilitarianism, pp. 423-427
- Hooker, Rule-Consequentialism, pp. 428-440
- Nagel, The view from Nowhere, Oxford University Press, New York 1986, chap. IX, pp. 164-185; repr. in S. Darwall (ed.), Deontology, Blackwell, Malden MA 2003, pp. 90-111.
- Ross, What makes right acts right?, pp. 756-762
- Nozick, The Rationality of Side Constraints, pp. 521-523
- Hursthouse, Normative virtue ethics, pp. 645-652
- Slote, Agent-Based Virtue Ethics, pp. 653-663
Section 3: Metaethics
- Ayer, A Critique of Ethics, pp. 16-21
- Mackie, The Subjectivity of Values, pp. 22-30
- Shafer-Landau, Ethics as Philosophy, pp. 54-62
- Brink, Moral Realism and the skeptical arguments from disagreement and queerness, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64, 1984, pp. 111-125.
- Strawson, Freedom and resentment, Proceedings of the British Academy, 48, 1962, pp. 187-211
- Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1997, pp. 155-184
- Hare, Moral Thinking, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1981, chap. 3, pp. 44-64 (you will find the whole book in the syllabus, but only chap. 3 is required reading)
- Taylor, Determinism and the Theory of Agency, pp. 308-311
Section 2: Normative theories
- Smart, Extreme and restricted utilitarianism, pp. 423-427
- Hooker, Rule-Consequentialism, pp. 428-440
- Nagel, The view from Nowhere, Oxford University Press, New York 1986, chap. IX, pp. 164-185; repr. in S. Darwall (ed.), Deontology, Blackwell, Malden MA 2003, pp. 90-111.
- Ross, What makes right acts right?, pp. 756-762
- Nozick, The Rationality of Side Constraints, pp. 521-523
- Hursthouse, Normative virtue ethics, pp. 645-652
- Slote, Agent-Based Virtue Ethics, pp. 653-663
Section 3: Metaethics
- Ayer, A Critique of Ethics, pp. 16-21
- Mackie, The Subjectivity of Values, pp. 22-30
- Shafer-Landau, Ethics as Philosophy, pp. 54-62
- Brink, Moral Realism and the skeptical arguments from disagreement and queerness, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64, 1984, pp. 111-125.
Assessment methods and Criteria
The examination will consist in: a) preparing a short paper (from 14000 to 18000 characters, bibliography excluded) on one of the topics discussed during the classes; this paper must be sent by email at least 7 days before the call and will account for 60% of the total score. b) taking an oral exam on the topics and the literature discussed in the classes (40% of the total score).
M-FIL/03 - MORAL PHILOSOPHY - University credits: 6
Lessons: 40 hours
Professor:
Reichlin Massimo