Language and Logic
A.Y. 2022/2023
Learning objectives
The course aims at an in-depth understanding of a current debate or research topic in the philosophy of language and logic.
Expected learning outcomes
Knowledge and understanding
Students will acquire in-depth knowledge of the main topics of the contemporary debate in the fields of philosophy of language and logic and the critical ability to discuss these topics.
Ability to apply knowledge and understanding
At the end of the course, students will be able to analyze complex problems within the philosophy of language and logic and to identify possible solutions to these problems. They will also be able to apply the skills and knowledge acquired to various research fields.
Students will acquire in-depth knowledge of the main topics of the contemporary debate in the fields of philosophy of language and logic and the critical ability to discuss these topics.
Ability to apply knowledge and understanding
At the end of the course, students will be able to analyze complex problems within the philosophy of language and logic and to identify possible solutions to these problems. They will also be able to apply the skills and knowledge acquired to various research fields.
Lesson period: First semester
Assessment methods: Esame
Assessment result: voto verbalizzato in trentesimi
Single course
This course cannot be attended as a single course. Please check our list of single courses to find the ones available for enrolment.
Course syllabus and organization
Single session
Lesson period
First semester
Course syllabus
The course focuses on some challenges to the principles of modus ponens, non-contradiction, and bivalence. The part on the principle of non-contradiction and the part on bivalence will feature a discussion of these principles in Aristotle's philosophy. Finally, we will address the problems raised by the context-sensitivity of natural languages.
Prerequisites for admission
No prerequisite other than those required by the program.
Teaching methods
Lectures and discussion with students.
Teaching Resources
Here's a bibliography for each topic discussed in the course.
MODUS PONENS
Stalnaker, R. (1968). "A Theory of Conditionals." In N Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory, 98-112. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers.
MacFarlane J. (2021) Philosophical logic. A Contemporary Introduction, Routledge, chapter IV
Cariani F. (2013) ''Modus Ponens'', APhEx 7
*Lycan W. (1993), ''MPP, RIP'', Philosophical Perspectives, 7, pp. 411-428.
*McGee V. (1985), ''A Counterexample to Modus Ponens'', Journal of Philosophy, 82, pp. 462-471.
*Kolodny N., MacFarlane J. (2010), ''Ifs and oughts'', Journal of Philosophy, 107:3, pp. 115-143.
THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-CONTRADICTION
IN ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY
Aristotele, Metafisica, Libro Gamma, traduzione italiana di E. Berti.
*Baltzly D. (1999) "Aristotle and Platonic Dialectic in Metaphysics Gamma 4", Apeiron, 32:3, pp. 171-202
Berti E. (1987) Contraddizione e dialettica negli antichi e nei moderni, L'Epos, Palermo.
*Cavini W. (2007) "Principia contradictionis. Sui principi aristotelici della contraddizione(§§ 1-3)" Antiqvorum Philosophia, pp. 123-169.
*Cavini W. (2008) "Principia contradictionis. Sui principi aristotelici della contraddizione(§ 4)" Antiqvorum Philosophia, pp. 159-187.
*Cresswell, M. J. (2003) "Non-Contradiction and Substantial Predication", Theoria, 69, pp. 166-183.
*Degnan M. J. (1999) "What is the Scope of Aristotle's Defense of the PNC?", Apeiron, 32:3, pp. 243-274.
*Lear J. (1980) "Proof by refutation", in Lear, J. (1980) Aristotle and Logical Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
*Lear J. (1988)"The most certain principle of being" from Lear, J. (1988) Aristotle: the desire to understand, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
*Lukasiewicz J. (1971) "On the Principle of Contradiction in Aristotle", The Review of Metaphysics, 24:3, pp. 485-509
*Priest G. (1998) "To be and not to be? that is the answer. On Aristotle on the Law of Non-Contradiction," Philosophiegeschichte und Logische Analyse, 1:91-130.
Franco Repellini F. (2005) "Aristotele e l'ontologia della Metafisica", in: AA. VV., La storia dell'ontologia, a cura di E. S.
Storace, Milano, Albo Versorio, pp. 31-45.
*Wedin M. V. (2004) "Aristotle on the Firmness of the Principle of Non-Contradiction", Phronesis, 49:3, pp. 225-265.
*Wedin M. V. (1999) "The Scope of Non-Contradiction: A Note on Aristotle's 'Elenctic' Proof in "Metaphysics" Gamma", Apeiron, 32:3, pp. 231-242.
IN THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE
*Priest G., Beall J. C., Armour-Garb B. (2004) The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford University Press.
*Smiley T. (1993) "Can Contradictions Be True?", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary 67, pp. 17-33.
*Priest G. (1993) "Can Contradictions Be True?", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary 67, pp. 35-54.
THE PRINCIPLE OF BIVALENCE
IN ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY
Aristotele, De Interpretatione, Cap. 9. Traduzione italiana di Pier Luigi Donini, da Ethos. Aristotele e il determinismo. Dell'Orso, 1989 pdf
*Ryle G. (1953) Dilemmas, Cambridge University Press, Cap. 2, pp. 15-35
*Smith Q., Oaklander L. N.(1995) Time, Change and Freedom. An Introduction to Metaphysics, Dialogue 9, pp. 119-132, Routledge, London
*Gaskin R. (1995) The Sea Battle and the Master Argument. Aristotle and Diodorus Cronus on the Metaphysics of the Future. de Gruyer, Berlin, Chaps. 1-14. pp. 1-216
*Algra K., Barnes J., Mansfeld J., Schofield M. (2000) The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, cap. 15
IN THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE
*Barnes E. Cameron R. (2008) "The open future: bivalence, determinism and ontology", Philosophical Studies 146:2, pp.291-309 .
*Todd P. (2016) "Future Contingents Are All False! On Behalf of a Russellian Open Future", Mind 125:499, pp. 775-798.
*Todd P. (2020) "The problem of future contingents: scoping out a solution", Synthese 197:11, pp. 5051-5072
THE CONTEXT-SENSITIVITY OF NATURAL LANGUAGES
Cappelen H. and Dever J. (2016) Context and Communication, Oxford University Press, Oxford
*Bach K. (2006) "The excluded middle: semantic minimalism without minimal propositions", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXXIII:2, pp. 435-442.
*Elbourne P. (2008) "The argument from binding. Philosophical Perspectives", 22, 47-68.
*Elbourne P. (2020) "Weather predicates, binding, and radical
contextualism", Mind & Language, pp. 1-17.
*Lasersohn P. (1999) "Pragmatic halos", Language, 75:3, pp. 522-551.
*Marti L. (2006) "Unarticulated constituents revisited", Linguistics and Philosophy 29, pp. 135-166
*Stanley J. (2000). "Context and Logical Form", Linguistics and Philosophy, 23, pp. 391-434.
*Stanley, J. (2002a). Making it articulated. Mind & Language, 17, pp. 149-168.
MODUS PONENS
Stalnaker, R. (1968). "A Theory of Conditionals." In N Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory, 98-112. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers.
MacFarlane J. (2021) Philosophical logic. A Contemporary Introduction, Routledge, chapter IV
Cariani F. (2013) ''Modus Ponens'', APhEx 7
*Lycan W. (1993), ''MPP, RIP'', Philosophical Perspectives, 7, pp. 411-428.
*McGee V. (1985), ''A Counterexample to Modus Ponens'', Journal of Philosophy, 82, pp. 462-471.
*Kolodny N., MacFarlane J. (2010), ''Ifs and oughts'', Journal of Philosophy, 107:3, pp. 115-143.
THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-CONTRADICTION
IN ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY
Aristotele, Metafisica, Libro Gamma, traduzione italiana di E. Berti.
*Baltzly D. (1999) "Aristotle and Platonic Dialectic in Metaphysics Gamma 4", Apeiron, 32:3, pp. 171-202
Berti E. (1987) Contraddizione e dialettica negli antichi e nei moderni, L'Epos, Palermo.
*Cavini W. (2007) "Principia contradictionis. Sui principi aristotelici della contraddizione(§§ 1-3)" Antiqvorum Philosophia, pp. 123-169.
*Cavini W. (2008) "Principia contradictionis. Sui principi aristotelici della contraddizione(§ 4)" Antiqvorum Philosophia, pp. 159-187.
*Cresswell, M. J. (2003) "Non-Contradiction and Substantial Predication", Theoria, 69, pp. 166-183.
*Degnan M. J. (1999) "What is the Scope of Aristotle's Defense of the PNC?", Apeiron, 32:3, pp. 243-274.
*Lear J. (1980) "Proof by refutation", in Lear, J. (1980) Aristotle and Logical Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
*Lear J. (1988)"The most certain principle of being" from Lear, J. (1988) Aristotle: the desire to understand, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
*Lukasiewicz J. (1971) "On the Principle of Contradiction in Aristotle", The Review of Metaphysics, 24:3, pp. 485-509
*Priest G. (1998) "To be and not to be? that is the answer. On Aristotle on the Law of Non-Contradiction," Philosophiegeschichte und Logische Analyse, 1:91-130.
Franco Repellini F. (2005) "Aristotele e l'ontologia della Metafisica", in: AA. VV., La storia dell'ontologia, a cura di E. S.
Storace, Milano, Albo Versorio, pp. 31-45.
*Wedin M. V. (2004) "Aristotle on the Firmness of the Principle of Non-Contradiction", Phronesis, 49:3, pp. 225-265.
*Wedin M. V. (1999) "The Scope of Non-Contradiction: A Note on Aristotle's 'Elenctic' Proof in "Metaphysics" Gamma", Apeiron, 32:3, pp. 231-242.
IN THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE
*Priest G., Beall J. C., Armour-Garb B. (2004) The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford University Press.
*Smiley T. (1993) "Can Contradictions Be True?", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary 67, pp. 17-33.
*Priest G. (1993) "Can Contradictions Be True?", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary 67, pp. 35-54.
THE PRINCIPLE OF BIVALENCE
IN ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY
Aristotele, De Interpretatione, Cap. 9. Traduzione italiana di Pier Luigi Donini, da Ethos. Aristotele e il determinismo. Dell'Orso, 1989 pdf
*Ryle G. (1953) Dilemmas, Cambridge University Press, Cap. 2, pp. 15-35
*Smith Q., Oaklander L. N.(1995) Time, Change and Freedom. An Introduction to Metaphysics, Dialogue 9, pp. 119-132, Routledge, London
*Gaskin R. (1995) The Sea Battle and the Master Argument. Aristotle and Diodorus Cronus on the Metaphysics of the Future. de Gruyer, Berlin, Chaps. 1-14. pp. 1-216
*Algra K., Barnes J., Mansfeld J., Schofield M. (2000) The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, cap. 15
IN THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE
*Barnes E. Cameron R. (2008) "The open future: bivalence, determinism and ontology", Philosophical Studies 146:2, pp.291-309 .
*Todd P. (2016) "Future Contingents Are All False! On Behalf of a Russellian Open Future", Mind 125:499, pp. 775-798.
*Todd P. (2020) "The problem of future contingents: scoping out a solution", Synthese 197:11, pp. 5051-5072
THE CONTEXT-SENSITIVITY OF NATURAL LANGUAGES
Cappelen H. and Dever J. (2016) Context and Communication, Oxford University Press, Oxford
*Bach K. (2006) "The excluded middle: semantic minimalism without minimal propositions", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXXIII:2, pp. 435-442.
*Elbourne P. (2008) "The argument from binding. Philosophical Perspectives", 22, 47-68.
*Elbourne P. (2020) "Weather predicates, binding, and radical
contextualism", Mind & Language, pp. 1-17.
*Lasersohn P. (1999) "Pragmatic halos", Language, 75:3, pp. 522-551.
*Marti L. (2006) "Unarticulated constituents revisited", Linguistics and Philosophy 29, pp. 135-166
*Stanley J. (2000). "Context and Logical Form", Linguistics and Philosophy, 23, pp. 391-434.
*Stanley, J. (2002a). Making it articulated. Mind & Language, 17, pp. 149-168.
Assessment methods and Criteria
A 10-15 page term paper on one of the articles marked with * (or on one of the articles in a collection marked with *).
Unita' didattica A
M-FIL/05 - PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY OF LANGUAGE - University credits: 3
Lessons: 20 hours
Unita' didattica B
M-FIL/05 - PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY OF LANGUAGE - University credits: 3
Lessons: 20 hours
Unita' didattica C
M-FIL/05 - PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY OF LANGUAGE - University credits: 3
Lessons: 20 hours