Philosophy of Science
A.Y. 2020/2021
Learning objectives
The course aims to provide students with a sound knowledge of the main topics in philosophy of science, with a focus on recent debates in philosophy of cognitive neuroscience.
Expected learning outcomes
Knowledge and understanding
At the end of the course, students will
- have a deep knowledge of key topics in philosophy of science, especially in philosophy of cognitive neuroscience
- master the literature in philosophy and cognitive neuroscience
- understand the philosophical implications of hotly debated issues in cognitive neuroscience
Ability to apply knowledge and understanding
At the end of the course, students will be able
- to develop a rigorous philosophical approach to cognitive neuroscience
- to integrate methodological tools and conceptual analysis
- to provide theoretically and empirically sounded arguments
At the end of the course, students will
- have a deep knowledge of key topics in philosophy of science, especially in philosophy of cognitive neuroscience
- master the literature in philosophy and cognitive neuroscience
- understand the philosophical implications of hotly debated issues in cognitive neuroscience
Ability to apply knowledge and understanding
At the end of the course, students will be able
- to develop a rigorous philosophical approach to cognitive neuroscience
- to integrate methodological tools and conceptual analysis
- to provide theoretically and empirically sounded arguments
Lesson period: First semester
Assessment methods: Esame
Assessment result: voto verbalizzato in trentesimi
Single course
This course cannot be attended as a single course. Please check our list of single courses to find the ones available for enrolment.
Course syllabus and organization
Single session
Responsible
Lesson period
First semester
Classes will be held on line on Teams or, if it is possible, in presence. Class calendar will be published on the Ariel site as well as on my homepage.
Course syllabus
ACTING TOGETHER. WHEN PHILOSOPHY MEETS COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES
A) Introduction to the main philosophical views on joint action. The role of shared intention and the debate about its reduction to individual intention.
B) Mechanisms and processes underpinning joint action. Some recent neuro-cognitive studies on acting together and their philosophical implications.
C) Joint and cooperative actions. An interdisciplinary approach.
The course is open to all students of the mater course in Philosophical Sciences and to all students of other master courses of the University of Milan who are interested understanding an ubiquitous phenomenon such as joint action from a theoretical and empirical point of view.
A) Introduction to the main philosophical views on joint action. The role of shared intention and the debate about its reduction to individual intention.
B) Mechanisms and processes underpinning joint action. Some recent neuro-cognitive studies on acting together and their philosophical implications.
C) Joint and cooperative actions. An interdisciplinary approach.
The course is open to all students of the mater course in Philosophical Sciences and to all students of other master courses of the University of Milan who are interested understanding an ubiquitous phenomenon such as joint action from a theoretical and empirical point of view.
Prerequisites for admission
No specific preliminary knowledge is required. Some background knowledge in action theory may be an advantage.
Teaching methods
Lectures
Debate and discussion
Debate and discussion
Teaching Resources
Reading and assignments for 9 ECTS
(1) Bratman, M. E. (1993). Shared intention. Ethics, 104, 97-113.
Bratman, M. E. (2014). Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapters 1-3.
Gilbert, M. P. (1990). Walking together: A paradigmatic social phenomenon. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 15, 1-14.
Gilbert, M. P. (2013). Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapters 1, 3-4.
Gold, N. & Sugden, R. (2007). Collective intentions and team agency. Journal of Philosophy, 104(3), 109-137.
Ludwig, K. (2016). From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action. Oxford University Press, chapters 12, 13, 15.
Pacherie, E. (2013), Intentional joint agency: Shared intention lite. Synthese 190 (10):1817-1839.
(2) della Gatta, F., Garbarini, F., Rabuffetti, M., Viganò, L., Butterfill, S. A., & Sinigaglia, C. (2017). Drawn together: When motor representations ground joint actions. Cognition, 165, 53-60.
Kourtis, D., Sebanz, N., & Knoblich, G. (2013). Predictive representation of other people's actions in joint action planning: An EEG study. Social Neuroscience, 8(1), 31-42.
Loehr, J. D., Kourtis, D., Vesper, C., Sebanz, N., & Knoblich, G. (2013). Monitoring individual and joint action outcomes in duet music performance. Journal of cognitive neuroscience, 25(7), 1049-1061
Meyer, M., Hunnius, S., Elk, M. v., Ede, F. v., & Bekkering, H. (2011). Joint action modulates motor system involvement during action observation in 3-year-olds. Experimental Brain Research, 211(3-4), 581-592.
Meyer, M., van der Wel, R. P. R. D., & Hunnius, S. (2013). Higher-order action planning for individual and joint object manipulations. Experimental Brain Research, 225(4), 579-588.
Novembre, G., Ticini, L. F., Schutz-Bosbach, S., & Keller, P. E. (2014). Motor simulation and the coordination of self and other in real-time joint action. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 9(8), 1062-1068.
Sebanz, N., Bekkering, H., & Knoblich, G. (2006). Joint action: Bodies and mind moving together. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(2), 70-76.
(3) Bratman, M. E. (1992). Shared cooperative activity. The Philosophical Review, 101(2), 327-341.
Carpenter, M. (2009). Just how joint is joint action in infancy? Topics in Cognitive Science, 1(2), 380-392.
Kutz, C. (2000). Acting together. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61(1), 1-31.
Searle, J. R. (1990). Collective intentions and actions. In P. Cohen, J. Morgan, & M. Pollack (Eds.), Intentions in Communication (pp. 90-105). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Searle, J. R. (2002) Consciousness and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (pp. 90-105).
Tomasello, M. & Carpenter, M. (2007). Shared intentionality. Developmental Science, 10(1), 121-5.
Tomasello, M. & Rakoczy, H. (2003). What makes human cognition unique? from individual to shared to collective intentionality. Mind and Language, 18(2), 121-147
Tuomela, R. (2016). Cooperation as Joint Action. Analyse & Kritik, 33(1), 65-86.
Reading and assignments for 6 ECTS
(1) Bratman, M. E. (1993). Shared intention. Ethics, 104, 97-113.
Bratman, M. E. (2014). Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapters 1-3.
Gilbert, M. P. (1990). Walking together: A paradigmatic social phenomenon. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 15, 1-14.
Gilbert, M. P. (2013). Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapters 1, 3-4.
Gold, N. & Sugden, R. (2007). Collective intentions and team agency. Journal of Philosophy, 104(3), 109-137.
Ludwig, K. (2016). From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action. Oxford University Press, chapters 12, 13, 15.
Pacherie, E. (2013), Intentional joint agency: Shared intention lite. Synthese 190 (10):1817-1839.
(2) della Gatta, F., Garbarini, F., Rabuffetti, M., Viganò, L., Butterfill, S. A., & Sinigaglia, C. (2017). Drawn together: When motor representations ground joint actions. Cognition, 165, 53-60.
Kourtis, D., Sebanz, N., & Knoblich, G. (2013). Predictive representation of other people's actions in joint action planning: An EEG study. Social Neuroscience, 8(1), 31-42.
Loehr, J. D., Kourtis, D., Vesper, C., Sebanz, N., & Knoblich, G. (2013). Monitoring individual and joint action outcomes in duet music performance. Journal of cognitive neuroscience, 25(7), 1049-1061
Meyer, M., Hunnius, S., Elk, M. v., Ede, F. v., & Bekkering, H. (2011). Joint action modulates motor system involvement during action observation in 3-year-olds. Experimental Brain Research, 211(3-4), 581-592.
Meyer, M., van der Wel, R. P. R. D., & Hunnius, S. (2013). Higher-order action planning for individual and joint object manipulations. Experimental Brain Research, 225(4), 579-588.
Novembre, G., Ticini, L. F., Schutz-Bosbach, S., & Keller, P. E. (2014). Motor simulation and the coordination of self and other in real-time joint action. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 9(8), 1062-1068.
Sebanz, N., Bekkering, H., & Knoblich, G. (2006). Joint action: Bodies and mind moving together. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(2), 70-76.
(1) Bratman, M. E. (1993). Shared intention. Ethics, 104, 97-113.
Bratman, M. E. (2014). Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapters 1-3.
Gilbert, M. P. (1990). Walking together: A paradigmatic social phenomenon. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 15, 1-14.
Gilbert, M. P. (2013). Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapters 1, 3-4.
Gold, N. & Sugden, R. (2007). Collective intentions and team agency. Journal of Philosophy, 104(3), 109-137.
Ludwig, K. (2016). From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action. Oxford University Press, chapters 12, 13, 15.
Pacherie, E. (2013), Intentional joint agency: Shared intention lite. Synthese 190 (10):1817-1839.
(2) della Gatta, F., Garbarini, F., Rabuffetti, M., Viganò, L., Butterfill, S. A., & Sinigaglia, C. (2017). Drawn together: When motor representations ground joint actions. Cognition, 165, 53-60.
Kourtis, D., Sebanz, N., & Knoblich, G. (2013). Predictive representation of other people's actions in joint action planning: An EEG study. Social Neuroscience, 8(1), 31-42.
Loehr, J. D., Kourtis, D., Vesper, C., Sebanz, N., & Knoblich, G. (2013). Monitoring individual and joint action outcomes in duet music performance. Journal of cognitive neuroscience, 25(7), 1049-1061
Meyer, M., Hunnius, S., Elk, M. v., Ede, F. v., & Bekkering, H. (2011). Joint action modulates motor system involvement during action observation in 3-year-olds. Experimental Brain Research, 211(3-4), 581-592.
Meyer, M., van der Wel, R. P. R. D., & Hunnius, S. (2013). Higher-order action planning for individual and joint object manipulations. Experimental Brain Research, 225(4), 579-588.
Novembre, G., Ticini, L. F., Schutz-Bosbach, S., & Keller, P. E. (2014). Motor simulation and the coordination of self and other in real-time joint action. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 9(8), 1062-1068.
Sebanz, N., Bekkering, H., & Knoblich, G. (2006). Joint action: Bodies and mind moving together. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(2), 70-76.
(3) Bratman, M. E. (1992). Shared cooperative activity. The Philosophical Review, 101(2), 327-341.
Carpenter, M. (2009). Just how joint is joint action in infancy? Topics in Cognitive Science, 1(2), 380-392.
Kutz, C. (2000). Acting together. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61(1), 1-31.
Searle, J. R. (1990). Collective intentions and actions. In P. Cohen, J. Morgan, & M. Pollack (Eds.), Intentions in Communication (pp. 90-105). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Searle, J. R. (2002) Consciousness and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (pp. 90-105).
Tomasello, M. & Carpenter, M. (2007). Shared intentionality. Developmental Science, 10(1), 121-5.
Tomasello, M. & Rakoczy, H. (2003). What makes human cognition unique? from individual to shared to collective intentionality. Mind and Language, 18(2), 121-147
Tuomela, R. (2016). Cooperation as Joint Action. Analyse & Kritik, 33(1), 65-86.
Reading and assignments for 6 ECTS
(1) Bratman, M. E. (1993). Shared intention. Ethics, 104, 97-113.
Bratman, M. E. (2014). Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapters 1-3.
Gilbert, M. P. (1990). Walking together: A paradigmatic social phenomenon. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 15, 1-14.
Gilbert, M. P. (2013). Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapters 1, 3-4.
Gold, N. & Sugden, R. (2007). Collective intentions and team agency. Journal of Philosophy, 104(3), 109-137.
Ludwig, K. (2016). From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action. Oxford University Press, chapters 12, 13, 15.
Pacherie, E. (2013), Intentional joint agency: Shared intention lite. Synthese 190 (10):1817-1839.
(2) della Gatta, F., Garbarini, F., Rabuffetti, M., Viganò, L., Butterfill, S. A., & Sinigaglia, C. (2017). Drawn together: When motor representations ground joint actions. Cognition, 165, 53-60.
Kourtis, D., Sebanz, N., & Knoblich, G. (2013). Predictive representation of other people's actions in joint action planning: An EEG study. Social Neuroscience, 8(1), 31-42.
Loehr, J. D., Kourtis, D., Vesper, C., Sebanz, N., & Knoblich, G. (2013). Monitoring individual and joint action outcomes in duet music performance. Journal of cognitive neuroscience, 25(7), 1049-1061
Meyer, M., Hunnius, S., Elk, M. v., Ede, F. v., & Bekkering, H. (2011). Joint action modulates motor system involvement during action observation in 3-year-olds. Experimental Brain Research, 211(3-4), 581-592.
Meyer, M., van der Wel, R. P. R. D., & Hunnius, S. (2013). Higher-order action planning for individual and joint object manipulations. Experimental Brain Research, 225(4), 579-588.
Novembre, G., Ticini, L. F., Schutz-Bosbach, S., & Keller, P. E. (2014). Motor simulation and the coordination of self and other in real-time joint action. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 9(8), 1062-1068.
Sebanz, N., Bekkering, H., & Knoblich, G. (2006). Joint action: Bodies and mind moving together. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(2), 70-76.
Assessment methods and Criteria
Students who attend at least 70% of the lectures will be assessed on the basis of two short papers (3000 words). Non-attending students have to write one short paper (3000 words) and take an oral examination. Evaluation criteria:
(A) the knowledge of the main topics of the course;
(B) the capability to integrate conceptual analysis and experimental methodologies as well as to master the relevant literature;
(C) independent judgment with respect to philosophical and scientific issues
(D) the ability to provide sounded arguments in written and oral communications.
(A) the knowledge of the main topics of the course;
(B) the capability to integrate conceptual analysis and experimental methodologies as well as to master the relevant literature;
(C) independent judgment with respect to philosophical and scientific issues
(D) the ability to provide sounded arguments in written and oral communications.
Modules or teaching units
Unità didattica A
M-FIL/02 - LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE - University credits: 3
Lessons: 20 hours
Unità didattica B
M-FIL/02 - LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE - University credits: 3
Lessons: 20 hours
Unità didattica C
M-FIL/02 - LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE - University credits: 3
Lessons: 20 hours
Professor(s)
Reception:
I am available for appointments any day. For urgent matters, I can be reached on Teams