Teoria dell'interpretazione e dell'argomentazione giuridica

To understand legal interpretation and legal argumentation (hereafter referred to as "legal-dogmatic"), it is essential to first understand that legal dogmatics is nothing more than a logical-dynamic science among others; one need only think, first and foremost, of dogmatic theology and prescriptive linguistics. Even more fundamentally, it is necessary to grasp the nature of dogmatic (or "axiomatic"—terms used interchangeably throughout) sciences, whether logical-dogmatic or logical-static (such as all varieties of mathematics or many types of ethics). The course will therefore begin with a general introduction to axiomatic sciences, using chiefly simple examples drawn from arithmetic, on one hand, and from dogmatic theology and descriptive grammar, on the other, to show that legal dogmatics is but a type of axiomatic-dynamic science, and more broadly, a type of dogmatic science *tout court*, which in the final analysis can be traced back to an empirical science. Once this fundamental aspect of legal dogmatics is clarified (with numerous anticipatory examples of specifically dogmatic-legal interpretation and argumentation), the remainder of the course will be devoted exclusively to the distinctive features of interpretation and argumentation—provided, of course, that students have adequately engaged with and assimilated the first part. The structure of the course is determined by the need to uproot the idea of the exceptionalism of legal dogmatics.